A WORD TO A RIGHT HONOURABLE COMMONER.

"A Word to the Wise is enough."

TRITE PROVERB.

LONDON:

Printed for J. DIXWELL, in St. Martin's-lane, near Charing Cross:

And M. COOPER, in Pater-noster-row.

MDCCLXI.

Oxford

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT,

Principal Secretary of State.

SIR,

I Presume not to approach you as a Minister or a Senator, but as a private Man; independent of all Posts and Employments. I speak the free unbiassed Sentiments of my own Conscience; I desire no Man to be of my Opinion who thinks I am wrong; nor do I wish to continue in any of them longer

than I may be removed to better ones: but until that Time I muſt beg to remain as I am. It is by that ineſtimable, I had almoſt ſaid ſacred, Liberty of the Preſs, which every Briton enjoys, that I am enabled to make this Addreſs to you; nor am I ſorry that I have no other Means; becauſe Addreſſes made in public are ſure to be ſeen, while thoſe delivered privately are not always certain of gaining Admittance.

It is reported, upon how ſure a Foundation I know not, that Differences have lately aroſe among the M——, if it be true, I tremble for the Conſequences of ſo great a Misfortune to this Nation, at a Time when its Arms have been attended with Succeſs and Victory in every Quarter of the Globe. That happy Unanimity which has ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed the Years 1758 and 1759, is ſaid to be broken in

the

the Year 1760, and its Members divided among themſelves in the Year 1761.

We are induced to give Credit to theſe Tales, becauſe our Fleets and Armies have been almoſt totally inactive during the whole laſt Year. It is a Myſtery why the grand Armament failed before it was carried into Execution; the Cauſe we are but too apt to attribute to ſome Diſagreement in the M——. The People whoſe Generoſity has lately ſeemed to know no Bounds, have certainly a Right by the Laws of our excellent Conſtitution, to expect an Account how their Millions are expended. If the Cauſe is owing to the Machinations of your Enemies; you have Friends; the Friends of their Country, who it is hoped are more numerous, and who will not ſee you degraded with Impunity.

We remember the Time when you clamoured againſt the Miſmanagement of a

weak and corrupted Miniſtry; we remember the Time when you moſt happily united thoſe Diviſions, which were fatal to the Intereſt of your Country; but now unfortunately we are told the Seeds of Party are again ſpringing up, theſe Cauſes are unknown; but their Conſequences are evident; and no Man ſteps in to turn theſe two Extremes into their medium Courſe.

We have had it confirmed on all Hands, that the French have been vigilant in equipping a Fleet at Breſt, which is ſaid to have taken on board a body of Troops, and a Quantity of Warlike Stores, and to be deſtined for the Iſle of Martinico; in order to prevent our becoming Maſters of it. Surely, Sir, you are not ſo great a Sceptic as to doubt the authenticity of this Intelligence: nay, Suggeſtion itſelf, is ſufficient to convince us, that a Nation leſs politic than France, would not ſuffer its

laſt

laſt valuable Plantation to fall into the Hands of her Enemies, and rivals in Commerce, if they could any way prevent it. And muſt this Fleet arrive at the important Place of its Deſtination before we attempt to take it? Or, are we to ſpend a Million of Money in making this Conqueſt? Or, Sir, are we to have it at all? We remember, that when the French were equipping an Armament at Toulon for the Conqueſt of Minorca, it was owing to a diſbelief of it in the late M——, that we loſt that valuable Iſland; and have we, or are we to loſe the faireſt Opportunity of taking Martinico, from the ſame Cauſe?

Whatever occaſioned the Failure of the grand Expedition, or where was the Object of its deſtination, I enquire not; they are, perhaps, Secrets only fit to be diſcloſed to proper Heads: but it muſt be

obſerved,

obſerved, that another Year's War, carried on in the ſame expenſive and inactive manner as that in 1760, will be injurious, almoſt fatally injurious, to this Nation; public Credit will not have that influence it has had; and the People will ceaſe to give when they ſee no uſe made of their Money: therefore, Sir, we muſt in earneſt, have either Peace or War; this medium between them, is extremely prejudicial to the Nation: if our Enemies will not grant us the former upon honourable Terms, we muſt vigorouſly purſue the latter by Sea.

Your Admirer,

Friend, and Servant,

FIVE MILLIONS!

A

WORD

To a Right Honourable

COMMONER.

SIR,

THE Eyes of the People are now ſo far opened, as to ſee the Evils attending a Continental War; they ſee that our ſupporting it is quite foreign to our Intereſts, and therefore injurious to ourſelves. That Tide of Popularity, and

moſt egregious Affront on common Underſtanding, has changed its Courſe; inſtead of rūning with an impetuous Precipitation among Rocks and Shoals, it has made a Channel on a much ſounder and leſs dangerous Bottom.

Thoſe ſanguine Friends of the German War, who urged the entering upon it with ſo much Violence, begin now to retract in their Compliments beſtowed on Frederick and Ferdinand; they now ſay, *they were never ſuch* very great *Admirers of thoſe Men*; *they liked them indeed, becauſe they are fine Generals.* The mighty Probus, that remarkable *Foreman* of the Mob, is moſt deſervedly ſunk into a State of Contempt: his ſtiff and fulſome Adulation on the Union of two Proteſtant Powers, to defend their Religion and fight it to the laſt, is now clearly diſcovered to be only the Product of blind Enthuſiaſm, a weak and ignorant Mind. It has been propoſed, that he collect into the Fields his loyal and zealous Followers; Followers in Opinion, ſuch as cannot but ſee the Proteſtant Religion is actually in Danger from the Union of two Roman Powers, and harangue them on this favourite Point; in order

order to prove the Falſity and Diſloyalty of that ſeditious Libel, entitled, *Conſiderations on the preſent German War*; and indeed in this Caſe he would act ſo like the Oracle at the Tottenham-Court Tabernacle, who lately harangued his eager-believing Flock, on that irreligious and blaſphemous Piece, the *Minor*, that the hiſtory of the two Impoſtors would well deſerve being recorded in our Annals.

It may be obſerved in moſt public Companies, that the hot Friends of the German War are aſhamed of the abſurd and ridiculous Opinions they once ſo eagerly embraced. They avoid talking on Politics, becauſe that it is a Subject which would expoſe their Weakneſs. The Noiſe of the Tower Guns, the Bonfires and Rockets, had ſo effectually lulled all their Senſes aſleep, they were not able, of themſelves, to diſtinguiſh what were real and ſolid Advantages to their Country, from thoſe which were entirely foreign to its Intereſts. They made more Rejoicings at the Birth-day of the King of Pruſſia, than for the taking of Louiſbourg and Quebec; and teſtified in a more noiſy Manner

their Approbation of the little Skirmiſh at Corbach, than the Taking of Guadalupe. Time has decovered what ſhallowPoliticians theſe are; and how inſenſibly and blindly they have followed that *Ignus Fatuus*, called the Balance of Power; a Balance which Great-Britain has laviſhed Millions of Pounds and Lives to equilibrate; and yet it is as doubtful and precarious as ever; an Affair which no ſenſible Man could ever prove us to have any intereſting or proper Concern in; an Abſurdity ſo clearly laid open, by the Author of the *Conſiderations on the preſent German War*, that ſurely, hereafter, no honeſt Engliſhman will attempt drawing his Country into a Connection with the Quarrels of German Princes; Meaſures which common Diſcernment may ſee are deſtructive of the true Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms.

England, by purſuing her real Intereſts on her natural Element, may bid Defiance to the Machinations of her Enemies on the Continent; they may threaten to invade her; but they will be only Threats; for while ſhe covers the Seas with her Fleets, none, nor all of them, will-

will proceed on ſo hazardous an Enterprize; which muſt be attended with certain Deſtruction, either before they can attempt to land, or before they can return to their own Country.

The Continental Powers very well know, that while we have a H—— to maintain, ſupport and preſerve, it is *there* they muſt attack our Vitals; *there* we ſhall feel them moſt ſenſibly; they can double our Number, and at half the Expence; and if they ſuffer a defeat, it is eaſily repaired, and all the loſt Advantage regained. Whereas, ſhould they meet us at Sea, we can double their Number, and give them a total Defeat.

To attack us by Land has been always the great Aim of France; H——er only was the deſtined Mark of her Force to ſhoot at: For it was never intended, becauſe it is not conſiſtent with the true Intereſt of France, to go any further than H——. We have a very convincing Proof of this, only three Years ago; when Marechal D'Etrees defeated the Duke of Cumberland at Haſtenbeck, the French entered

tered Hanover immediately; but though they had above half a Campaign to puſh on their Conqueſts in, they never ſo much as once entered Magdebourg, to favour the Deſigns of the Empreſs-Queen; they ſtaid only in Hanover. The Reaſon of this is plain; becauſe it is not for the Intereſt of France to ſee the King of Pruſſia cruſhed; for he will always be a Rival to her natural Enemy, the Houſe of Auſtria.

If the Engliſh ſuffered the French to go into Hanover, and even to plunder it, did ſhe but ceaſe to defend it, the French would ſeek an Opportunity of reſtoring it; and make an Attonement for all the Damages they committed in it; provided Great Britain, in the Interim, heartily attacked them by Sea. It is evident that France only threatens to conquer Hanover, becauſe ſhe knows England will at all Events defend it, however inconſiſtent it is with her real Intereſt. While we ſpend millions in this uncertain Defence, we feed the Politics of France; and ſhe by putting us to this Expence, is playing a winning Game for herſelf. Surely

every

every ſenſible Man who is acquainted with the Strength of France will allow, that ſhe can conquer Hanover if ſhe heartily ſets about it; againſt all the Defence which England is able to make for it; but were ſhe to do this, Great-Britain muſt in conſequence be obliged to ſpend her Millions elſewhere: A Meaſure which France moſt dreads. If France, at this time, wanted to make Conqueſts in the Empire, why does ſhe not attack the other States, who are leſs able to defend themſelves? Her Friendſhip for the Empreſs-Queen can be no Obſtacle. The Truth is, it would not now ſo effectually anſwer her preſent Purpoſes; which are only to diſtreſs England, and which ſhe can only do by drawing our Men and Money into Germany, and protracting the War till our Coffers are drained of the laſt Guinea in ſupporting it.

If we reflect a Moment on what are the true Intereſts of France, Reaſon will point out to us that new Acquiſitions in the Empire, at this Time, would prove burthenſome to her; ſhe therefore does not ſeek them, becauſe the Ex-

pence

pence of garriſoning their fortified Towns would be greater than her Finances can at preſent ſupply; beſides, ſhe is afraid leſt England ſhould vigorouſly attack her by Sea, and then ſhe would not have a ſufficient Force at hand to defend her Maritime Towns and oppoſe the Invader; whereas an Army can with much greater Facility, and much leſs Expence, be moved about, than thoſe Troops in Garriſon.

The State of the Intereſts of the Belligerant Powers is ſuch, that it is not for the Intereſts of all the Confederates on either Side, to ſee all their Enemies deſtroyed; therefore theſe are impolitic Unions; ſince the Powers, for the Sake of themſelves, will never heartily aſſiſt their Allies. The old Proverb, *When I have ſerved myſelf, I will help my Friend,* is underſtood in all Nations.

For the Reaſon already aſſigned, France will never ſuffer the Downfall of Pruſſia; and ſeveral States in the Empire will join with her in this Cauſe. The two Empreſſes are the only

Powers

Powers who can deſire ſuch an important Stroke. The lower the Houſe of Auſtria is kept, the ſtronger will be the Power of France. Again, it is the Intereſt of Pruſſia and Auſtria to keep Ruſsia out of the Empire: But if Pruſſia ſhould ever become too powerful for the Imperial Force, and ſhould overthrow it, Ruſsia muſt expect to be next attacked by the Conqueror. Therefore a Balance of Power is eſſentially neceſſary between theſe four Potentates.

France and Auſtria are Oppoſites by Intereſt; but the Intereſts of France and Pruſſia are ſynonimous, *viz.* to check the Ambition of the Houſe of Auſtria: Ruſsia indeed can no way affect the Intereſts of France, except by ſtrengthening the Hands of the Empreſs Queen againſt her. It is the Intereſt of Pruſſia to keep the Ruſſians at a Diſtance, and to humble the Pride of the Houſe of Auſtria. Ruſſia is conſulting and purſuing her own Advantage in the moſt certain Manner; ſhe has gained a Footing in Germany, and will doubtleſs keep it: She can be no otherwiſe ſerviceable to Auſtria, than by giving her Aſſiſtance in caſe of an Attack

from the Infidels. The Empreſs Queen, it is evident, has ſuffered her Paſſion to carry her beyond her Reaſon: it was a wrong Step to bring the Czarina into the Confederacy againſt Pruſſia, for ſhe has thereby got footing in Germany, and may, in future, become her moſt dangerous Enemy: She has done right in making War with Pruſſia, becauſe it is her Intereſt to cruſh that Monarch; but then France will not ſee that done; therefore here again ſhe has choſen a wrong Ally. Pruſſia and Auſtria may be ſaid to be Principals in the preſent Quarrel, becauſe it is their Intereſt to humble one another; but their Allies are unſkilfully choſen. The German Allies of Pruſsia can give him no Aſsiſtance, except they neglect to defend themſelves; and his Treaty with Great-Britain, who has ſupported him with Money, will expire at the Cloſe of the preſent Year; and ſhe now ſeeing the injurious Effects of it to herſelf, will hardly renew that Treaty. As for the Allies of Auſtria, France will never lend a helping Hand towards dethroning the Pruſsian Monarch; nor was it for the Intereſt of Auſtria to invite the Czarina to

ſuch

ſuch a Meaſure, as ſhe will thereby become too near and powerful a Neighbour to the Imperial Dominions.

The King of Pruſſia foreſaw the Impropriety and dangerous Conſequence of ſuffering the Ruſſians to come into the Empire : when Great Britain made a ſubſidary Treaty with Ruſſia, whereby a numerous Army of that Crown were to march into Hanover for its Protection, he boldly declared, he would keep all foreign Troops out of the Empire. This Declaration was founded on the Principles of true German Policy ; and thereby he ſhewed, he was in the Intereſt of himſelf.

Had England not been concerned in the German Quarrel, which, whatever partial Writers ſay to the contary, was entirely independent of the Diſputes in America*, it is

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* If it ſhould be thought this Aſſertion is falſe, becauſe of our Connexion with Hanover; I beg to obſerve, that a Rupture was unavoidable between Pruſſia and Auſtria, in which, I hope, it will be allowed, our Affairs in America had no Concern.

certain that Pruſſia and France would have united againſt Auſtria and Ruſſia: a convincing Proof of which intended Union is in a Letter which the K—. of P—. ſent to the late K— of G—— B——. in the Year 1757, juſt after the Battle of Collin (June 18); a Tranſlation of it, from the French, in which Language it was written, you will find in the Note †. If this Letter was not authentic, it would have been contradicted by the ſuppoſed Receiver; but ſo far from that, a Declaration was delivered to the

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† "I am informed, that the Deſign of a Treaty of Neu-
" trality, for the Electorate of H—— is not yet laid aſide.
" Is it poſſible that your M—— can have ſo little For-
" titude and Conſtancy, as to be diſpirited by a ſmall
" Reverſe of Fortune? Are Affairs ſo ruinous, that they
" cannot be repaired? I hope your M—— will conſider
" the Step you have made me hazard; and remember,
" that you are the ſole Cauſe of theſe Misfortunes, which
" now impend over my Head. *I ſhould never have aban-*
" *doned the Alliance of France, but for your flattering Aſſu-*
" *rances.* I do not now repent of the Treaty I have con-
" cluded with your M——; but I expect you will not in-
" glorioufly leave me at the Mercy of my Enemies, after
" having brought upon me all the Forces of Europe. I de-
" pend upon your adhering to your repeated Engagements
" of the twenty-ſixth of laſt Month, and that you will liſten
" to no Treaty, in which I am not comprehended."

P——

P—— Reſident in London, which appears to have been calculated as an Anſwer to it.

On the preſent Plan of fighting, France and Ruſſia are the only Powers who can be ſolid Gainers; and, except the Empreſs-Queen gets Sileſia, for which, it muſt be acknowledged, ſhe has already ſpent more Money than it is worth, and even this Advantage may be over-balanced by the dangerous Nearneſs of her new Neighbours, the Ruſsians, all the reſt of the Powers are waſting their Subſtance on defenſive Meaſures; by which they can have no Hopes of being Gainers. While Auſtria exhauſts herſelf in ſtriving to regain Poſſeſſion of Sileſia, ſhe is, in the moſt effectual Manner, ſerving the Intereſt of France; for the weaker ſhe makes herſelf, with the greater Facility can France over-run the Empire on ſome future Occaſion. France has already got Poſſeſſion of Oſtend and Nieuport, as Keys to the Auſtrian Netherlands; and when ſhe has tired the Patience of England, or exhauſted its Treaſure, in defending Hanover, ſhe will next

attack

attack the Houſe of Auſtria, her old and natural Enemy.

France would become formidable by the Ruin of the Houſe of Auſtria, and Ruſſia by that of Brandenburgh; for obſerve, the Intereſts of France and Pruſsia only agree in humbling the Houſe of Auſtria; and when that is ſufficiently done, France will not care whether the Czarina dethrones the Monarch of Pruſsia, or he drives her to the Gates of Moſcow. The Ruſsians having footing in the Empire, will not ſo much affect France, as Auſtria's becoming too formidable for her to enter the Empire hereafter; becauſe the principal Strength of the former will always be too far diſtant; whereas that of the latter may be brought, at a ſmall Expence, to her own Frontiers, as ſhe hath often experienced.

If the Empreſs of Ruſsia ſteadily purſues her own Intereſt, as, hitherto, her Conduct in the preſent War hath plainly evinced, there is no room for the King of Pruſsia to hope ſhe will ever accede to a general Peace, without

retaining

retaining Pruſsia in her Hands; nor will this perhaps content her: it is now her grand Aim to ſeize Pomerania, not ſo much becauſe it is contiguous to Pruſsia, as the Empire. It is not a Halfpenny Matter to her, whether Pruſsia or Auſtria poſſeſſes Sileſia; ſhe does not ſo much endeavour at wreſting Sileſia out of the Hands of the Pruſsian Monarch, as Pomerania; therefore ſhe may be ſaid to be fighting her own Battles, not thoſe of her Ally the Empreſs-Queen.

The Situation of Pruſsia and Pomerania is ſuch, that if they were annexed to the Ruſsian Crown, that Empire would thereby become one of the moſt formidable Potentates in Europe; for theſe Acquiſitions would in the moſt effectual Manner pave her a Way into the very Bowels of the Empire. They are not of that Importance to the King of Pruſsia, becauſe they border on the Sea; therefore all their maritime Advantages are loſt to him, through the Want of a mercantile Trade, and a Fleet to over-awe the Swedes and Danes, who are by Intereſt jealous of his ambitious Paſsion.

Ruſsia

Ruſsia having a large mercantile Trade, and a Fleet the moſt formidable in the Baltick, can make them productive of infinite Advantages.

Having endeavoured to explain the ſeveral Intereſts of the belligerant Powers, will any ſenſible and unprejudiced Engliſhman ſay, it is for the Service of his Country to intermeddle with the Concerns of theſe foreign Princes? Or, that England has any natural or advantageous Connection with ſuch Concerns; Would it be one Penny a Year Difference to England, whether Auſtria poſſeſſed Sileſia or Pruſsia? whether the Pruſsian Monarch was circumſcribed within the original Bounds of his Dominions, or permitted to conquer as far as he had Troops to garriſon? Whether Saxony is indemnified for the Ravages committed in it by the King of Pruſsia, ſince the Quarrel was purely his own? Whether Pruſsia reverts to its Monarch, or is retained by the Czarina? or whether ſhe or he poſſeſſes Pomerania? If any of theſe can affect the Intereſt of Great-Britain, it is what I cannot perceive; if not, why are

we

we to expend Millions on the Continent in adjuſting Diſputes which are none of our own?

If there is a Neceſſity for our being connected with the Continent for the ſake of defending Hanover, and the Treaty with the King of Pruſſia was made with that View; would not the ſending a Britiſh Fleet into the Baltic Sea, have been a leſs expenſive Meaſure to England, than ſending our Men into Germany, and more effectually anſwering all the Purpoſes of this continental Alliance?

Had England two Years ago ſent a Fleet into the Baltic, ſhe had aſsiſted her Ally in a Manner which was conſiſtent with her own natural Strength. But unhappily, there were a Party who oppoſed this ſalutary Meaſure with their utmoſt Force. They alledged, that the King of Denmark would ſend Thirty-ſix Thouſand to join the Swedes, in order to plunder Hanover, as ſoon as a Britiſh Fleet ſhould appear in the Baltic; which would alſo draw upon us the Reſentment of the Ruſſians and Swedes; who might with their combined Fleets, fail

out of the Baltic and land upon the Coaſt of Ireland or Scotland, Twenty-thouſand Men. Such were the Reaſons againſt our ſending a Fleet into the Baltic; which, you will eaſily perceive, are far from being founded on Maxims of true Policy.

As ſoon as the King of Denmark heard it had been propoſed in England to ſend a Fleet into the Baltic, he concluded a Treaty with Ruſsia and Sweden; whereby they agreed to protect the Commerce of the Baltic from all Moleſtation. The King of Denmark, it muſt be acknowledged, moſt prudently conſulted the Intereſts of his People by this Meaſure; and while their Commerce flouriſhes without Interruption, he receives large Subſidies in Conſideration of his Neutrality; therefore his Kingdom will in all probability, become ſo enriched and powerful, as to be the Wonder of a future Age.—But if a Britiſh Fleet compelled him to a Neutrality, he would no longer receive large Subſidies in conſideration of his Forbearance. Upon what Account is England ſo tacitly obliged to conſult the

Intereſt

Intereſt of this Monarch? Is it becauſe when the Rebels had penetrated as far as Derby, in the Year 1746, ſhe demanded of him the Number of Troops ſtipulated by Treaty, and he refuſed to comply with this equitable Requeſt, though then aSon-in-law to the lateKing? Had England as prudently conſulted her own Intereſt, ſhe would not have neglected ſending a Fleet into the Baltic. The weakeſt Reaſons urged againſt this moſt neceſſary Meaſure, by the weakeſt Men, filled the Northern Powers with an Apprehenſion that we were afraid of giving them Umbrage; therefore the Court of Peterſburgh behaved with a haughty Inſolence to the Britiſh Miniſter. It was an Error in the Conduct of the B—— G———t, to ſuffer a few fallacious Reaſons againſt ſending a Fleet into the Baltic, to over-rule Common Senſe, and Common Policy. The united naval Strength of Denmark, Ruſsia and Sweden, is not ſufficient to oppoſe a Fleet which England could ſpare for this Purpoſe. If the Danes refuſed it Admittance, their Maritime Towns and Fortifications might ſoon be demoliſhed and razed to the Ground; their Troops

would then find Employment enough at Home to prevent their joining the Swedes; who would alſo feel ſuch a ſevere Scourge from a vigilant Engliſh Admiral, as not to be able to invade Pomerania again during the preſent War: Ruſsia would no longer be able to keep poſſeſſion of Pruſsia, nor to harraſs its Monarch; if her numerous Armies had not Work enough to protect Peterſburgh and Cronſtadt, the reſt would ſtarve on the Weſt Side of the Viſtula, for want of Proviſions, which are always brought to them by their Fleet; a Navigation which would be totally deſtroyed, as ſoon as the Britiſh Fleet appeared in the Baltic: and, is it not reaſonable to urge, that the King of Pruſſia would, if he acted the Part of an honeſt Ally, in Conſideration of ſuch material Aſſiſtance, ſend thoſe Troops to join the Allied Army, whom he now Employs againſt the Ruſsians and Swedes: the Britiſh Troops in Germany might then be brought Home, and employed on Services purely Engliſh.

I know, and am extremely ſorry for it, that the K— of P—— can refuſe, by the Tenor

of

of the Treaty, or rather Convention, which England has concluded with him, to ſend or lend a ſingle Man, either for the Protection of Hanover, or any Service which is not purely his own. We have bound ourſelves to pay him, annually, and at one Time, Six Hundred and Seventy Thouſand Pounds Sterling; but we have only bound him to employ it in the moſt advantageous Manner for himſelf. What Britiſh Subject could be ſo very erroneous, as to aſſert, ſuch a Stipulation was to the Honour of his King? what Britiſh Subject could be ſo ignorant, as to think ſuch a Stipulation was for the Intereſts of his Country? Will it be ſaid, in Oppoſition even to common Reaſon, it is for our Advantage to ſend Millions to Germany to ſupport a Conteſt, which no Matter who gets the better, will not make a Penny Difference to us? I ſaid, if the King of Pruſsia acted the Part of an honeſt Ally, he would ſend his Troops againſt the French, in caſe a Britiſh Fleet found the Swedes and Ruſsians Employment enough at Home; his not being obliged to do this, nor any thing elſe, without he pleaſes, induces me to hope he would act, at leaſt, upon the Principles of Gratitude;

Gratitude; but to confeſs my real Sentiments, I doubt his Gratitude.

The real Intention of our Alliance with Pruſsia, was the Preſervation of Hanover; particularly, the keeping the French out of it; or, as it was termed, the keeping of Foreign Troops out of the Empire; which he, with our Aſsiſtance, *promiſed* to do; but he has not fulfilled this Promiſe: nay, ſo far from it, what has he contributed towards it? A few of his Troops have been in the Allied Army, and it was expected they would have aſsiſted in driving the French to their own Frontiers; but how great muſt our Surprize be, when we are told, that theſe few Pruſsians in the Allied Army, actually refuſed to charge the French in the Battle of Crevelt; and, it is ſaid, the faireſt Opportunity of defeating the French was thereby loſt. Why was that Affair ſtifled up, which, had it not been for the Author of the Conſiderations on the preſent German War, Nine Tenths of our honeſt Engliſhmen had never heard of it? Are we to pay immenſe Sums to a foreign Prince, and ſuffer with Impunity ſuch manifeſt Ingratitude?

titude ? I ſay Ingratitude, becauſe we cannot *oblige* him to give us any Aſsiſtance; that Treaty, which is perhaps the moſt eminent Demonſtration of *Engliſh Sagacity* and Pruſsian Policy, that ever was laid before the Eyes of the World, now Subſiſting between him and us, allows of no ſuch Thing: and ought we not to be as greatly Surprized, to ſee your Name at the bottom of this more famous Convention, than that of Cloſter-Severn ? Is it becauſe he wants to be Friends with France, that his Troops would not attack thoſe of that Nation? or to what ſhall we impute this ſtrange Piece of Miſconduct, which for three Years has been ſo carefully huddled up ?

Though it might be thought injurious to the future Credit of England to break off her Alliance with Pruſsia, yet ſurely it will be allowed, by all reaſonable Men, that he has not fulfilled his Promiſe in keeping all foreign Troops out of the Empire. Had he done this, he had been the Defender of Hanover; which, according to the preſent Syſtem of Politics, (however Inconſiſtent it may appear to unprejudiced

prejudiced Eyes) is the ſame as aſsiſting England; but this being neglected, and his Troops *refuſing* to give Aſsiſtance in an Action, partly on an Engliſh Cauſe, leaves in our Minds a very different Idea to that which we would Entertain of an Ally of Great Britain.

The Friends of this German War will ſay, that the King of Pruſsia attacked and defeated the Troops of France in the Battle of Roſbach. I admit it: but need we be long at a Loſs to Account for this Procceding? Had he not done this, he would have found it a difficult Matter to get ſo much Money from England as he does. If the Hanoverians and their Allies, who had laid down their Arms by the Convention of Cloſter-Severn, had not been enabled to reſume them, England would not, nay, could not, have defended Hanover; and except England would enter upon that Step, no plauſible Reaſon could be given for ſupporting Pruſsia: Therefore he fought the French becauſe they were joined with the Troops of the Empire; and all the World knows, the Hanoverians reſumed their Arms in conſequence of the Battle

of

of Roſbach. For their further Encouragement he gave them a Pruſsian General, which, it muſt be owned, pleaſed the Engliſh mightily; who were by this Time become ſo fond of every Thing that bore the Name of Pruſſian, that our Bakers, in Order to Acquire a greater Cuſtom, made Pruſſian Loaves, Pruſſian Cakes, &c. The Haberdaſhers, in Order to pleaſe our Ladies, who bore a large Share in the Torrent for the Pruſſian Demi-God, invented Pruſſian Flies, Pruſſian Caps, &c. and there was Pruſſian Purl, and Pruſſian Ale, for the Mob to Drink. But to return to our Argument; did the Pruſsian Troops in any other Action attack the French when they were alone? Did they not in the firſt Battle they were in, when the French were ſingly oppoſed to them, abſolutely refuſe to charge the Enemy?

Thus it appears the King of Pruſsia, when it was in his Power, and when there was an Opportunity, has not even aſsiſted to keep the foreign Troops out of the Empire. Would not this afford a Nation, leſs Honeſt and more Politic than ourſelves, the moſt plauſible Rea-

ſons for abandoning ſuch Alliance? and would not any Nation but ourſelves, have ſeized that Opportunity, if its Intereſt were as foreign to it as ours are? So would England perhaps, had not H——— been ſituated where it is; which is ſo convenient for the Pruſsian Monarch to over-run and ravage it, that, however great the Expence be, we muſt purchaſe his Friendſhip.

Millions of Engliſh Money have been laviſhed away, in defence and on account of this Electorate. The Earl of Sandwich, in the Year 1743, with great Propriety ſaid, "It "was vain and endleſs to exhauſt the national "Treaſure, in enriching a hungry and barren "Electorate." And the Duke of Bedford, the Year before, with as great Juſtice obſerved, "That theſe Electoral Territories had long "been conſidered as a Gulph into which the "Treaſure of Great Britain had been thrown: "That the State of Hanover had been changed "without any viſible Cauſe, ſince the Acceſ-"ſion of its Princes to the Throne of Eng-"land: Affluence had begun to wanton in

"their

" their Towns, and Gold to glitter in their
" Cottages, without the Diſcovery of Mines,
" or the Increaſe of Commerce; and new Do-
" minions had been purchaſed, of which the
" Value was never paid from the Revenues of
" Hanover."

I have already obſerved, it is the Intereſt of Pruſsia to keep the Ruſsians out of the Empire; therefore theſe Troops he has frequently attacked; whether in conjunction with the Auſtrians or ſingly. Both theſe Powers are his Enemies, and it is his Intereſt to humble them both; when he attacks the Ruſsians, it may be ſaid, he is endeavouring to fulfil the Treaty he made with England, the keeping foreign Troops out of the Empire; but it is not material to England, whether the Ruſsians are in the Empire or not; they will never attack Hanover, becauſe of its great Diſtance from their Dominions. England is afraid of France attacking it; which Pruſsia did not in the leaſt attempt to prevent; he only ſtrove at keeping thoſe Troops out of the Empire, which it is not his Intereſt ſhould have footing in it.

I have but one Thing more to mention, before I quit the Affairs of the Continent. It is concerning the Conduct of D—— F——, in his Capacity of Co—— of the Al—— Army, which has not of late extorted from us the uſual Expreſsions of Adoration, it formerly did. Great Faults have been found with him; and it has been obſerved that theſe Cenſurers, are not the Miſanthropes of a diſcontented Party, but the Friends of their Country. They have obſerved that it tarniſhes the Glory of this Nation to ſuffer its Troops to be commanded by a Foreigner, hired by their own Money to Command them; who was recommended to this eminent Poſt by the King of Pruſſia, whom we tacitly permited to give us Law: That ſuch a Step, before it was taken, muſt by a Patriot Miniſter be well known to be Diſtaſteful to the People: That he has a Diſlike to ſeveral of the Officers of this Nation; and that not being an Engliſh General, whether he can, by us, be called to an Account for his Conduct, in Caſe it ſhould be found neceſſary. Theſe are the Objections which have not been Anſwered, even by thoſe who have avowed themſelves his Friends.

There

There are another ſtring of Allegations, which have been printed in the common Newspapers, with Anſwers to them; and ſeem to have been collected by one of the Admirers of this German General. But, as I do not approve of theſe Anſwers as ſufficiently refutary, and, denying Heathen Mythology, cannot deify him in his mortal Capacity, I ſhall make a Reply to them: Perhaps it is becauſe I have never been made drunk, with the pompous Tales of a Party, the Admirers of this German General and Germanic Warfare, nor my Eyes yet dazzled with his varniſhed Picture, that I cannot join with the Mob in his Defence.

ALLEGATION I.

" The Britiſh Generals have not been per-
" mitted to command ſeparate corps, or de-
" tachments.

ANSWER.

" It is ſufficiently known they are Strangers
" to the Country and the Language; therefore
" it would be highly imprudent to give them

a

" a ſeparate Command when they are not able
" to converſe with Spies and Guides."

REPLY.

If the Admirers of this German General had ſtudied ſeven Years for an Anſwer, they could not have made one more weak and ridiculous. The Allegation is a Fact, and can be anſwered no other Way, than becauſe he chuſes to beſtow ſuch Poſts of Honour and Profit on his neceſſitated Countrymen, who want to enrich themſelves. The not being able to converſe with Spies andGuides is a Jeſt; there are Interpreters; but French is ſpoke by almoſt all of them, and it ſurely will be acknowledged that moſt of our Officers can ſpeak French. It might very properly be aſked, why the Britiſh Generals, in the ſame Country, were permitted to hold ſeparate Commands in the Duke of Marlborough's Time? And it might as very properly be anſwered, becauſe there was an Engliſh Commander in Chief.

ALLEGATION II.

" There has been a Miſunderſtanding among
" the Officers and private Men, which has en-
" creaſed to an Animoſity."

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

" It ſhould be conſidered, who firſt treated " the German Officers with Contempt, and " deſpiſed them becauſe they were not ſo rich, " nor their Pay ſo great as themſelves."

REPLY.

The brutiſh Behaviour of the German Officers is alone ſufficient to make them deſpiſed, even by the juſt-civilized Indian. They are dead to every generous Sentiment, and untinctured with the leaſt Spirit of Affability; that broody Moroſeneſs and ſullen Selfiſhneſs, ſo conſpicuous even in their very Countenances, ſetting aſide all external Marks of Diſguſt in their Conduct, renders their Company ſcarce endurable; ſo very far is it from being agreeable. If they were Objects of Contempt in the Eyes of the Engliſh, the Commander, had he acted prudently, would, inſtead of fomenting this Animoſity, have endeavoured to check it in its Infancy, and united the Diviſions in his Army. The Truth is, the two Parties were headed by their Commanders in Chief, who heartily hated each other.

ALLE-

ALLEGATION III.

" The Britiſh Troops have always been placed in the warmeſt Parts of every Action."

ANSWER.

" It was agreeable to their Requeſt, which " has always been, to have the Poſt of " Honour."

REPLY.

If the Troops deſire to ſacrifice themſelves, muſt the General grant them that Requeſt? Or is it becauſe they know not how to run away, that they are placed in the warmeſt Parts of the Action? Are the Germans ſo eager for the Poſt of Honour? If ſo, why are they not put in it? If not (which is moſt likely) are the Germans only placed there to write endleſs Encomiums on the Britiſh Troops conquering without them? An impartial Perſon who has read the Accounts from the Allied Army, will ſay, the Germans have never been very forward in aſſiſting the Britiſh Troops in the Day of Action; but rather on the contrary. What Honour does ſuch Conduct reflect on thoſe Men, who

may

may be ſaid to be the Principals? The Britiſh Troops fight their Battles, and have been ſacrificed, that they may retreat in Safety *, in their own Cauſe; for it is in Defence of Hanover, not England, that they are fighting.

ALLEGATION IV.

" There has been a Scarcity of Forage and " Proviſion in the Army, which has been fre- " quently in great Want."

ANSWER.

" This is true; but the Purveyors, and not " the General, are to be blamed and called to " Account for it. This Scarcity has prevented " his making ſeveral bold Strokes, whereby he " might have gained ſome ſolid Advantages."

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* It is acknowledged, even in the London Gazette, July 22, 1760, That, at the Skirmiſh at Corbach, the Retreat was attended with a little Confuſion. The Truth is, the Heſſians and Hanoverians had given Way; and a Squadron of Bland's, and another of Howard's Regiment of Dragoons, were allowed to ſuffer, that the others might *ſave themſelves*.

REPLY.

It was a Maxim of the famous Marechal Count de Saxe, who the Admirers of Duke Ferdinand, I ſuppoſe, will, at leaſt, allow to be equal to him, " That it ſhould be, and " always was, the firſt and principal Care of a " prudent General, to provide Proviſions and " Forage for his Army, and to provide for its " Health and Preſervation." The Purveyors may indeed be blamed; they may be indolent; they may be villainous; but all this will not extenuate the Commander in Chief: He is to ſuperintend them, and, where they are faulty, to puniſh them according to their Deſerts. If this is not his Buſineſs, he is robbed of half the Reſpect that is due to him. If it is, and there is no Precedent to the contrary, is not he to be called to an Account for ſuch a Dearth in his Camp? The Money ſent from England is ſufficient to provide continual Plenty for that Army, and there is Proviſion enough in Germany to be had for Money, excluſive of the large Exports made to it from England, which ought to be conſidered as an Overplus, or at leaſt given in at the Bargain.

ALLE-

ALLEGATION V.

" The Engliſh have been obliged to pay " double for every thing they bought."

ANSWER.

" It is well known that wherever the Engliſh " come they ſpoil the Market."

REPLY.

Admitting them to have ſpoiled the Market, does that *oblige* them to pay them double? Why is not the Market alſo ſpoiled for the Germans? The Engliſh can ſcarce ſpoil it for themſelves only; why are not the Germans obliged to pay double by the ſame Rule? Such a ſtrange Partiality can never be accounted for, by the Engliſh endeavouring to make their own Condition worſe.

ALLEGATION VI.

" Had the General not been ſo fond to put " the Money in his Pocket, ſome important " Action had been performed with ſuch an " Army as he now commands."

ANSWER.

" He has not had the Fingering of the " Money, conſequently could not put any of " it into hisPocket. He has often repreſented " that the Enemies were twice the Number of " his Army; and he has not received a Rein- " forcement that might enable him to act Of- " fenſively."

REPLY.

A Falſity is here propoſed to invalidate a ſuppoſed Fact. He is by right of his ſuperior Command allowed to have the Fingering of the Money: And has he not then an Opportunity of putting what he pleaſes into his Pocket? Is he not Avaritious? Are there any Proofs to the contrary? What then muſt we think of a General who has evtravagant Remittances of Money, receives Proviſions and Forage from England beſides, and yet ſuffers his Army to be on the Point of ſtarving? The Enemies were never twice his Number: At this Time the Armies are nearer equal, than ever they were. It is well known, that the Sum of Twelve Hundred Forty-four Thouſand, one

Hundred

Hundred and Seventy-ſeven Pounds, Nineteen Shillings, and Nine-pence Three Farthings, was granted by the Britiſh Parliament for Maintaining, in the Year 1759, Fifty-ſeven Thouſand and Twelve Germans. To which Number we may add, Twenty Thouſand Engliſh; and was it ever known that the French in Germany during the preſent War were twice that Number?

It may be very juſtly aſked, why Duke Ferdinand, with ſuch an Army as he now Commands, was inactive almoſt the whole laſt Campaign? And what Anſwer can be given; that he is deſirous of protracting the War, only that he may enrich himſelf by it? And let it be obſerved that he has with him a greater Number of Britiſh Troops than ever the great Duke of Marlborough had, who it muſt be allowed frequently did more in one Campaign than he has done in three.

After ſuch a Diſcuſſion of Circumſtances and Intereſts, will it be ſaid it is our Concern, who is Emperor of Germany, of Ruſſia, or

King

King of Pruſſia? If they Quarrel it is amongſt themſelves; which ever are Gainers by it will not affect our Intereſts; but if we intermeddle we are ſure to be loſers by it. Commerce alone is the Wealth of theſe Kingdoms, and Commerce alone ought to be the Object of their Attention; and whatever Power attempts to interrupt us, it becomes our immediate Concern and Intereſt to repel Force by Force.

It is a weak, abſurd, and fallacious Argument, made up to ſerve the Purpoſes of a Party, which endeavours to prove, that our Conqueſts in Aſia, Africa, and America, are in conſequence of our drawing the French into Germany; firſt let it be obſerved, that we have not drawn the French into Germany; but all the World knows they have drawn us thither: the French are at this Time only proſecuting their original Intention; namely, the cauſing us to ſpend Millions in defending Hanover, and dying the German Plains with Britiſh Blood. Had we ſuffered the French to go into Hanover, and further if they choſe it, would that have prevented our making Conqueſts of the French

Settle-

Settlements, in the more diſtant Parts of the World? Surely not, but rather have facilitated it, as our Troops might have been employed there; while now they are ſlaughtered in defending what is foreign to our Intereſt. Had the French never marched into Germany at all, but employed their whole Force in defending their Settlements, could not we have taken them? the hood-winked Friends of the German War ſay no: but the diſcerning Part of Mankind, and the Friends of their Country, anſwer in the Affirmitive.

As this is the main Pillar of our Argument, it is proper to wave all other Things till this Point is cleared. The Admirers of a Germanic Warfare ſay, the French out-did us in America before we made our Alliance with the King of Pruſſia. The Aſſertion, literally, is true; but our Alliance with the King of Pruſſia, a Power entirely foreign to us, and our Affairs in America, was not the Cauſe of their diſcontinuing victorious there. Until Admiral Boſcawen, and the Generals Amherſt and Wolfe, took the Iſle of Cape-Breton, all

our

our Commanders were either imprudent or indolent. The Raſhneſs of Braddock and Abercrombie excited Diſpleaſure. The Conduct of Mr. Shirley and Lord Loudon was far from being Satisfactory. It would be an invidious Taſk to enquire into the Cauſes of their Miſcarriages and Inactivity; but it may be obſerved, that the Affairs of the Britiſh Nation were not attended with Succeſs during their ſeveral Commands. Pruſſia nor Hanover had nothing to do with this.—We come now to another Article in our main Argument; that had we not found Employ for the French Troops in Germany, they would have ſent them to America. The Aſſertors of this muſt deny our Sovereignty over the Sea; or, at leaſt, aver, that the French muſt bribe our Admirals and Captains to connive at ſuch a Tranſportation. How abſurd muſt this Notion appear, to thoſe who do but for a Moment conſider the formidable Strength of the Britiſh Navy, and the ruined State of that of France; whoſe very Commerce is almoſt totally deſtroyed; whoſe Ports have been ſo blocked up, that even a ſingle Cruizer or Advice Boat could

not

not get in or out without the greateſt Danger of being taken by ſome of the Britiſh Navy ſtationed before them. How then could they ſend Troops to America? Had but one Third of our Money been expended in America, that is annually exported to Germany, the French would not, at this Time, have in their Hands that vaſt and important Province, Louiſiana; nor the Iſle of Martinico. But while we waſte Millions in ſupporting a German War, from which, all impartial and ſenſible Men will readily allow, we can reap no real Advantage; we cannot afford Thouſands to be expended in enlarging our Commerce, without being loaded with the moſt grievous and inſupportable Impoſitions. It ought to be a Maxim with the Engliſh Government, that whenever they are determined to attack France by Land, they muſt engage in a powerful Confederacy againſt her; for when we take Pruſſia alone, or Auſtria alone, the throwing the other into the Arms of France is the certain Conſequence; and the Intereſts of Pruſſia and Auſtria are ſo different, they can never be brought to unite againſt France. Therefore we, inſtead of having an

uſeful Friend, have only a needful Ally; which turns the Scale againſt us.

Having cleared myſelf of Continental Connexions, I will next ſpeak of Things nearer Home.

Our late intended Expedition has brought upon us the Ridicule of all Europe. The foreign Gazettes tell us, with a Sneer, "The "Engliſh Admiral at length found the con- "trary Wind he was ordered to look out "for"; and apply the trite Proverb with an uncommon Satisfaction, "The Mountain "in Labour has brought forth a Mouſe." Is it not owing to ſome ſtrange Miſconduct in our M———, that we are expoſed to theſe, and many other ſuch-like Inſults? Shall a Nation, whoſe Arms have been victorious in the four Quarters of the World, be the Scoff and Laughing-ſtock of its Enemies? Have we not national Pride that diſdains the very Thoughts of it?

It has been conjectured, that the grand Armament was deſtined to make a Conqueſt of

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the Iſland of Belleiſle; the Importance of it, and the great Service it would be to England, put a Probability on the Conjecture. It is affirmed, the Iſland has one good Harbour, can afford plenty of Proviſions to a Fleet ſtationed in the Bay, and ſhould it be conquered, may be held as eaſy as we do the Iſlands of Jerſey and Guernſey. France would ſuſtain an infinite Loſs by it; her naval Communication between all her northern and ſouthern Ports would be entirely cut off, or at leaſt rendered extremely hazardous and difficult. A further, and fuller Account of its Importance was Inſerted in one of the public Papers; an Account, which ſo evidently ſhews the Neceſſity of taking it, by pointing out its real Uſe and Advantage, to either France or England, that I cannot omit the Inſerting it.

" The Attacking the Iſle of Belleiſle, at this " Time, would put the French into as great " an Alarm, and draw as many of their Troops " that Way, as if we were to Attack any " Part of their main Land, becauſe it lies " in the Center of their principal trading " Towns, and almoſt as near the main Land as

" the Iſle of Wight is to Portſmouth, and would
" conſequently put them into as great a Con-
" ſternation as we ſhould be in, if they were
" Maſters of the Sea and the Iſle of Wight, from
" not knowing which Part of our Coaſt might
" be attacked next: for which Reaſon they
" muſt ſend for a large Body of Troops
" from the Rhine or elſewhere, to cover all
" their Weſtern Coaſt; and they muſt ſend a
" great Number of Troops to guard the Iſlands
" of Dieu, Rhee, and Oleron, which lie to the
" Southward of Belleiſle, and to Uſhant and
" Groce, which lie to the Northward, in order
" to prevent, if they can, our becoming Maſ-
" ters of them alſo.

" As the Iſland of Belleiſle lies directly op-
" poſite to Port Louis and L'Orient, none of
" their Eaſt-India Ships could ever get in or
" out of thoſe Ports, if it was in our Poſſeſ-
" ſion; and as Breſt has no inland Navi-
" gation to it, nor any Materials whatſoever
" in it, for the building, repairing, or fit-
" ting out Ships, but what are brought to it
" by Sea, from Bayonne, Bourdeaux, Nantz,

" Rochfort,

" Rochfort, Port Louis, &c. and which they
" carry thither in the Time of War with great
" Safety, between this Iſland and the main
" Land, in ſpite of our Ships of War, who
" know nothing of that Navigation; the tak-
" ing of it would put an End to ſuch Com-
" merce; ſo that the French would not be able
" to fit out a ſingle Ship from Breſt, after
" their preſent Stores are exhauſted. Belleiſle
" is the largeſt Iſland on the French Coaſt,
" and moſt commodious of all to Annoy them:
" It is capable of maintaining a great many
" Troops by its own Produce; who, if they
" were lodged there, might as Occaſion ſhould
" offer, make further Attempts upon the other
" Iſlands; thus keep the French conſtantly
" alarmed, and finally ruin the little Remains
" of their Trade. The Road of Belliſle is as
" good as that of St. Helen's, and our Ships
" of War might lie as ſafe there, as they do at
" Spithead; and if we ſhould erect on it Arſ-
" nels and Magazines, our Ships, ſtationed in
" the Bay, might be ſupplied with every Thing
" all the Year round, without coming home,
" as they have hitherto done; which has al-

" ways

" ways given the Enemy an Opportunity to
" get in and out of their Ports unmoleſted."

I have been informed, that the Tranſports which ſailed from Corke to join the grand Armament from England, actually made (as the Sea Term is) the Iſle of Belleiſle, but not finding the reſt of the Fleet, returned to England; for when the Orders for laying the Expedition aſide, were ſent to Portſmouth, it was not poſſible, on Account of the Weſterly Winds, to ſend Advice of it to Corke, therefore thoſe Tranſports and Ships ſailed agreeable to their firſt Orders.

If it was the Intention of the B—— M—— to make a Conqueſt of this important Iſland, as there are great Reaſons to believe it was, the Enemy ſeem to have been informed of it, if we may judge from the Preparations they made for its Defence: They tranſported to it, in open Boats, a conſiderable Number of Troops; and by the ſame hazardous Conveyance, they ſent to it Cannon, Mortars, and all other neceſſary Implements to reſiſt the Efforts of an

Attack.

Attack. This, it is ſaid, was done before the Death of his late Majeſty. But a Circumſtance, perhaps the moſt extraordinary, relative to this Expedition, is in the Bruſſels Gazette, about a Month before it was laid aſide, where M. Maubert ſays, the grand Expedition of the Engliſh would not fail at all; and poſitively aſſerts, that in a little Time it would be laid aſide. Our News-writers were ſo extremely cautious, they never tranſlated this extraordinary Article. His Pen too was the firſt Courier that told the World of the Scarcity of Proviſions in the Allied Army, and of the Faults which had been found in England with its Commander's Conduct, and of the Propoſition of a Party to ſubvert him, by replacing the D—— of C———. It is not poſſible that theſe Articles ſhould be the Fruits of Maubert's own Invention; there is the greateſt Probability to Imagine he is aſſiſted by ſomebody who is, I am afraid, too near our ———.

To ſome unaccountable Fatality muſt we impute the Loſs of the faireſt Opportunity we ever had, or perhaps ever may have, of taking

Martinico.

Martinico. What ſhall be ſaid for the whole of that ſtrange unſucceſsful Attempt upon it in the Year 1759. We were told, that the Troops landed without Oppoſition at Point Negres, in Port Royal Harbour, drove the Enemy from their Entrenchments and lay under Arms all Night; that in Conſideration of the badneſs of the Roads to Port Royal, which was five Miles diſtant, General Hopſon propoſed to Commodore Moore to land the heavy Cannon at the Savannah, which is oppoſite to Port Royal; but the latter informed him he could not do it 'till the Troops on Shore, had *ſilenced* the Weſt-ſide of the Fort. Can it be believed that they preferred the Safety of one, or two at moſt, of his Majeſty's Ships to the taking this important Iſland? How ſhall we reconcile this, to the Account a French Officer has given of the Force at that Time in Port-Royal. He ſays that the Garriſon conſiſted of no more than Two Hundred and Thirty-ſix private Men and Fourteen Officers; they had for their Subſiſtence, ſays he, only One Hundred Barrels of Beef, and very little Water in their Ciſterns. It was a Jealouſy between the

Officers

Officers that did the Miſchief; therefore the Troops were re-embarked, when the Garriſon were beginning to think of capitulating. Had Unanimity ſubſiſted, or ſome other Perſons been ſent on this Enterprize, Martinico had probably, long ago been in our Poſſeſſion.

The Miſchiefs its Privateers have done our Trade are inconceivable. At only Six Months after the taking of Guadalupe there were Ninety Privateers belonging to Martinico, which in that Time had taken not leſs than Two Hundred Sail of Merchant Ships, valued, at leaſt, at Six hundred Thouſand Pounds! This is a convincing Proof that our Trade has ſuffered more, the firſt half Year only, after the taking Guadalupe, than it had done before, during the whole War. It is now two Years ſince the taking of Guadalupe; and our Trade has continued to ſuffer in Proportion to the preceding Account. To what ſhall we attribute this unaccountable, nay, almoſt ruinous Suffrage? To the Neglect of the Fleet and Cruizers on that Station? Or to the Obſtinacy of that Officer who thought he had done

enough for his Country at the taking of Guadalupe? Had the brave and vigilant Captain Tyrrel been permitted to carry a broadPendant on this Station, will it be believed our Trade would have ſuſtained the immenſe Damages it has?—Never—It muſt be allowed too, that there are very few, if any Captains in theBritiſh Navy, better acquainted with the Winds, Currents,Creeks, &c. than he. In the earlierAges of the World, that honeſt Maxim, of Rewarding and Promoting MERIT was ſteadily obſerved. Now-a-days Rewards and Promotions are only to be had by Intrigues and Intereſt; by being a Great Man's Tool, his Dupe, or Bully. If a Man has too much Pride and Honeſty, to ſink beneath himſelf, to fawn, to cringe, to lye, to flatter, he gets no Promotion.—So much for the unſucceſsful and paltry Attempt on Martinico; which, like that on Quebec, in the Year 1711, has brought Diſgrace on our Nation, and Ruin on our Trade.

In Europe we fare no better; every Day are Advices brought, of Six, Eight, or Ten, of our Merchants Ships being carried into the different

different Ports of France. The French Merchants finding their Trade deſtroyed, have Recourſe to fitting out Privateers; which if they increaſe another Year with the ſame Rapidity they did the laſt, there will be very little Probability of any of our Ships getting ſafe home from our Colonies. Our Trade is now more extenſive than ever, and our Merchant Veſſels are more numerous than ever; therefore the more Diligent his Majeſty's Cruizers ought to be, in clearing the Seas of thoſe Swarms of the Enemy's Privateers. The French Merchants, notwithſtanding we boaſt of having ruined them, will, if we allow the great Succeſs of their Privateering to continue, ſoon accumulate large Fortunes; while ours, of Courſe, muſt be reduced to Bankruptcy. It would be a vain Thing for the Engliſh Merchants to equip Privateers, becauſe the Enemies have very little Trade, and Privateers are ſeldom willing to Attack each other, ſince it is the very End of their Errand to Attack the defenceleſs trading Veſſels. It is in your Wiſdom, that we muſt expect an Expedient to prevent this Ruin of our Trade; we rely on your known

Abilities, Patriotic Zeal, and Integrity, for every good Meaſure that is conducive of Advantage to both King and People. However, we cannot but demur at ſeeing our Men of War, nailed as it were on the Coaſt of France, and the Enemy's Ships eſcaping out of the River Villaine, where they have been blocked up fourteen Months, at an Expence to England of more than they are worth; and eſcaping out of Breſt and elſewhere, with Facility. Had we taken the Iſle of Belleiſle, the Enemy's Ships could not have eſcaped out of their Weſtern Ports; and all the winter, and diſmal Horrors of a Bay Station, had been removed; our Men, and Ships of War, would have found Refreſhments and Security in its Harbour and Lee Shore.

Theſe are Facts which attract Public Attention. From the Opinion which we entertain of your Wiſhes, and unwearied Endeavours for the Good of your Country, we attribute theſe Cauſes of general Complaint, partly, to a Neglect in the executive Part of your well laid Deſigns; but principally, to the

malicious

malicious Machinations of a Party, who are envious of your Eſteem among honeſt Engliſhmen, who have left no Stone unturned, no Step untaken, nor no Meaſure unpurſued, however dangerous, nay ruinous to their Country, to degrade the Man who is its great Support.

Your Friend and Admirer

FIVE MILLIONS!

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

A Few Minutes ago, Report brought the diſagreeable News to my Ear, that England had renewed her Treaty with Pruſſia. Surely this cannot be true. Is it poſſible, that England can be ſo blind to her own Intereſts, as to ſupport this German War, which Pruſſia and Auſtria have kindled up in the Empire? What Millions have we already ſpent on this continential Service! and are we to Spend more? Are we to exhauſt our national Treaſure, nay impoveriſh ourſelves, in ſupporting a foreign Prince to fight *his own* Battles? Whoſe Intereſt is no way connected with ours; who owes us no more Friendſhip, than while we pay him immenſe Sums; and who, in all probability, as ſoon as the preſent War is ended, will join in League with France, our natural Enemy.

I will admit, that his joining with France cannot affect England; ſince the Deſign of ſuch a Junction would be only to deſtroy the Houſe of Auſtria: but if it was his Intereſt, he would perhaps as ſoon join with any Power againſt England. His Conduct at the Eve of the preſent German War, when the K— of England was afraid of his entering Hanover, which occaſioned his calling the Ruſſians to its Relief, is alone ſufficient to convince us of this. The under-hand Dealings of Tradeſmen, are not more common than the Perfidy of Princes.

If the Pruſſian Treaty is actually renewed, I think it argues ſome radical Fault, in the Conſultations on the Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms; ſome pernicious Partiality of proſecuting a Continental War, becauſe it is for the Benefit of a few who hold lucrative Poſts. We may very well aſſure ourſelves, that D—— F——, and the reſt of the German Officers, in the Allied Army, are not deſirous of procuring a Peace immediately; their Conduct during the whole laſt Campaign, is a ſtriking Proof of this: It is their Intereſt to protract

tract the War, becauſe they are well paid with Engliſh Money. Nor would the Pruſſian Monarch care to what length the War was continued, while his Army is paid by us, if he was ſure of not being compelled to fight by the manœvres of his Enemies; and certain of procuring Men to replace thoſe ſlain in Battle.

Upon the preſent Plan of carrying on the War, nothing is more evident, than that the Britiſh Subjects are loaded with exorbitant Taxes, to prevent thoſe of Pruſſia paying more than their ordinary Revenues, as they are in the time of Peace; for it is well known, that the Pruſſian Monarch, has not, ſince the breaking out of the preſent War, impoſed one new Tax on his Subjects.

Reſpecting the Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms, I have but one Thing more to mention; that a ſtanding Army is, of all Things, one of the moſt Prejudicial to them. Little need be ſaid on a Subject ſo often handled. In general Terms, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that a ſtanding Army is inconſiſtent with the nature of Engliſh Ser-

vices;

vices; had we no Connexion with the Continent, we ſhould have very littleEmploy for an Army, and probably one third of that Number we now maintain, would be ſufficient to garriſon all the neceſſary Places in the Britiſh Dominions. But it will be aſked, what muſt become of the other two Thirds, ſince they are already raiſed? Allow them certain Proportions of Land in North America, which they may cultivate, and, with Induſtry, accumulate Fortunes. Some ſuch Meaſure ought to be conſidered, immediately after ſigning the next Peace.

Our Anceſtors, for many Generations, ſafely relied on what they called their two great Bulwarks, the Navy and the Militia: Even during the Wars between the Houſes of York and Lancaſter, the Party that prevailed diſbanded their Army as ſoon as the Action was over, and ſcorned to ſecure themſelves by *a military government*. But now the Times are ſo altered, it is judged almoſt an unſafe Meaſure to put Arms into the Hands of the People, leſt they ſhould thereby become enabled to aſſert their

rights, diſcover the corrupted Machines of the baſe and unworthy; check the Influence, or perhaps ſeize the Tools of unlawful and arbitrary Power. If this is not the Caſe, why is the Militia for the County of ——— not yet raiſed?

I am aware of a private Objection (which by the bye is a great one) that will be made to diſbanding the greateſt Part of the Army: *What ſhall be done with all our Young Nobility!* Many of them have not Fortunes to ſupport their Dignity, therefore it is neceſſary they ſhould have Poſts in the Army? Either put them into Naval (in which I include the Marine) or into Civil Employments.

As Great Britain is more Reſpectable in conſequence of her formidable Navy, than the intrepidity of her Troops, our naval Force can hardly be too ſtrong. It were to be wiſhed that ſo many King's Ships were not put out of Commiſſion at the End of a War, as frequently are; for our continuing to be formidable on the Ocean, is ſuch a Check on the

Ambition

Ambition of our Enemies, that they will not haſtily preſume to break the Ties of Friendſhip; in either attempting to diſturb our Trade, or Plantations; when our natural Strength is ſo ready to reward their Treachery.

The Inhabitants of this Kingdom reap ſome Advantage from a Fleet in Commiſſion, which they do not from a ſtanding Army. The King's Ships are always paid at home; therefore the Money is ſtill among us; and it is well known that none are more ready to circulate it, than the Sailors: but an Army is frequently paid abroad; therefore the Money is exported from us, to the great Detriment of every Man in Trade.

It would be preſumptious in me to aſſert how far the naval Strength of this Nation might, or ought to be exerted: But it muſt be obſerved, it is the only natural Strength which we have; and ought to be the principal Strength on which we ſhould rely. Hence ariſes the important Queſtions, why this natural and principal Strength has not been lately employed? And

why fifteen Months have been ſuffered to elapſe, with almoſt the whole Royal Navy in Commiſſion and nothing done? We ſeem to be ſunk into a State of Lethargy, like that in 1756, when we permitted the French to take Minorca, and to make Conqueſts in America againſt a ſuperior Force.

All attention, in ſpite of common Senſe and common Honeſty, is warped to the Affairs of Germany; Things which are ruinous and foreign to this Nation. When ſome little Advantage is gained in that Country (witneſs the taking of the Town of Fritzlar) though not of half the Importance as the taking a French Frigate, the Gazette, in order to intoxicate us with the grand manœuvre, gives us a dull, tedious, and unintereſting Narrative of the March of the Army, over a hundred hard Names, which Britiſh Ears never heard before, which ſwells the *unknown* Advantage to a Tranſaction of great Importance; as for inſtance,

" The Hereditary Prince cantoned his Corps
" at Zuſchen; and receiving Advice that the
" Garriſon

" Garriſon of Fritzlar was not prepared for an " Attack, he went thither; with a few Batta- " lions, in Hopes of being able to carry that " Place at once. He attacked it with great " Spirit, but the Enemy defending it reſolute- " ly, *and taking all Advantages their Situation* " *afforded them*, the Hereditary Prince thought " it adviſeable to deſiſt from the Attempt.*"

Who ever doubted their taking all Advantages their Situation afforded them? Did the Hereditary Prince? To be ſure, it is neceſſary to tell the Mob, that the French, by taking all Advantages (which they ought not to have done) and which was dealing very *unfairly* with us, held the little town of Fritzlar, and baffled the Deſign which the Hereditary Prince had formed againſt it. This Art is to ſcreen a bad Cauſe from a weak Mind, and encourage the Rabble ſtill to adore Prince F——, get drunk at the News of his Victory, and run mad on the rejoicing Night.

An Engliſhman, who knows nothing of military Affairs, would take theſe German Gene-

* See the Gazette of Feb. 24.

rals

rals to be as ignorant as himſelf, when he comes to the following Part of the ſame *Extraordinary Gazette.*

" The Hereditary Prince cantoned his Troops
" about Hademar, not far from Fritzlar. Lieut.
" Gen. Breidenbach took Poſſeſſion of a Ma-
" gazine of 40,000 Rations at Roſenthal, and
" advanced towards Marpurg. The Attempt
" he made upon that Town did not ſucceed,
" *the Enemy being upon their Guard. He himſelf*
" *was even killed in the Attack.*"

It is not to be imagined that General Breidenbach expected to find *the Enemy upon their Guard*; no, he expected they would ſurrender immediately on his Appearance before the Town. He was ſuch an experienced Officer, that he could not apprehend *the Enemy would be upon their Guard* while he was marching thro' a Country which they poſſeſſed.—Did he believe they would open their Gates and ſtrew Flowers in the Roads where he marched? Unfortunately, on this little Town he made an unſucceſsful Attack; in which *even he himſelf*

was

was killed : But the Writer of the Gazette has forgot to tell us *even* how many more are killed.

This *extraordinary Gazette* has another *extraordinary* Paſſage, the moſt puzzling of any; for it ſurpaſſes all the Logic of Maubert. The Bruſſels Gazette ſhall no longer be famed for falſe Reaſoning and unintelligible Accounts: Maubert ſhall no longer enjoy Pre-eminence in the Temple of Dulneſs, Ignorance, and Falſehood. His Rival on the contrary Side of the Water will totally eclipſe him in his Harveſt of Laurels. How fair this audacious Rival ſtands for pulling him down from all his Dignities, take the following Scrap of his own Rhetoric, and you will diſcover without any Information.

" In the mean while, my Lord Granby " made ſome *Demonſtrations* towards Guderſ- " berg."

The Writer of the Gazette would very much oblige the Public, if he would, in his next Number, *demonſtrate* what is the Meaning of the Word *Demonſtrations* in this Senſe; or, if he cannot, whether he was of Opinion, or whether

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whether he was informed, and thought it imprudent to tell it at full Length, that Lord Granby had loſt himſelf in the Woods of Heſſe, and was therefore obliged to *demonſtrate* by the Sun and Stars, with a Quadrant, whereabouts he was, what *Latitude* he was in, and the *Longitude*; and what Diſtance Guderſberg *bore* from him, Weſt, Eaſt, North, or South.

FINIS.